Deception through telling the truth?!: Experimental evidence from individuals and teams

Arbeitspapier

Informational asymmetries abound in economic decision making and often provide an incentive for deception through telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this paper I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling the truth should be classified as deception too if the sender chooses the true message with the expectation that the receiver will not follow the sender's (true) message. The experimental data reveal a large degree of 'sophisticated' deception through telling the truth. The robustness of my broader definition of deception is confirmed in an experimental treatment where teams make decisions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2007-26

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: deception ; expectations ; team decision making ; individual decision making ; experiment ; Betrug ; Asymmetrische Information ; Entscheidung ; Test ; Kooperatives Spiel

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Sutter, Matthias
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
• (wo): Innsbruck
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71949
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ