Arbeitspapier

The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence

We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a 'one principal-two agent' context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedbackmechanisms and private-verifiable feedback is the most informative mechanism. Yet, subjects also exhibit some behavior that cannot be explained by our baseline model, such as telling the truth even when this will definitely hurt them, interpreting 'no feedback' more optimistically than they should, and being influenced by feedback given to the other agent. We show that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for some, but not all, of these findings. We conclude that in addition to being naive, some agents also suffer from self-serving biases and engage in non-Bayesian social comparisons in their interpretation of performance feedback.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1524

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Subject
Lab experiments
Performance feedback
Strategic communication
Cheap talk
Persuasion
Multiple audiences
Lying

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ertaç, Seda
Koçkesen, Levent
Özdemir, Duygu
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)
(where)
Istanbul
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ertaç, Seda
  • Koçkesen, Levent
  • Özdemir, Duygu
  • Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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