Strategic data sales to competing firms

Arbeitspapier

The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing. We study the incentives of a data broker to sell data about a segment of the market to three competing firms. The segment only includes a share of the consumers in the market around one of the firms. Data are never sold exclusively. Despite the data are particularly tailored to the potential clientele of one of the firms, we show that the data broker has incentives to sell the list to its competitors. Such market outcome is not socially optimal, and a regulator that aims to maximise consumers and social welfare should consider mandating data sharing.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: JRC Digital Economy Working Paper ; No. 2021-05

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Antitrust Law ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Information and Internet Services; Computer Software ; Business Economics ; Marketing
• Subject: data markets ; personalised pricing ; price discrimination ; oligopoly ; sellingmechanisms

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Delbono, Flavio ; Reggiani, Carlo ; Sandrini, Luca
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC)
• (where): Seville
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/266522
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET