Hazard Risk Management as a Principal-Agent Problem: A Comparison of Principal- and Agent-Salient Risk Indicators
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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1 Online-Ressource.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Hazard Risk Management as a Principal-Agent Problem: A Comparison of Principal- and Agent-Salient Risk Indicators ; day:3 ; month:10 ; year:2024 ; pages:1-23
Economics of disasters and climate change ; (3.10.2024), 1-23
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Creator
- Contributor
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s41885-024-00166-0
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2412192114339.377326259603
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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15.08.2025, 7:33 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Frimpong, Eugene
- Howard, Gregory
- Brown-Kruse, Jamie Lynette
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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