- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783867885119
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Essen
- (who)
-
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
- (when)
-
2013
- Creator
-
Leonhardt, Nadine
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201312203650
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
2025-08-14T10:45:33+0200
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Leonhardt, Nadine
- Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Time of origin
- 2013
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