Arbeitspapier
Democratic Peace – A Principal-Agent Approach
The present paper explicitly models the principal-agent relationship between a democratic population and its elected representative within a standard war bargaining setup. I find that the specific structure of this relationship and the problems resulting from it help overcome information asymmetries in crisis bargaining. This provides an alternative theoretic explanation of democracies‘ signaling advantage which may turn out to be more realistic than the concept of audience costs.
- ISBN
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978-3-86788-511-9
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 453
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
- Subject
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democratic peace
principal-agent problems
crisis bargaining
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Leonhardt, Nadine
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
- (where)
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Essen
- (when)
-
2013
- DOI
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doi:10.4419/86788511
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Leonhardt, Nadine
- Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Time of origin
- 2013