Arbeitspapier
Democratic Peace – A Principal-Agent Approach
The present paper explicitly models the principal-agent relationship between a democratic population and its elected representative within a standard war bargaining setup. I find that the specific structure of this relationship and the problems resulting from it help overcome information asymmetries in crisis bargaining. This provides an alternative theoretic explanation of democracies‘ signaling advantage which may turn out to be more realistic than the concept of audience costs.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86788-511-9
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 453
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
- Thema
-
democratic peace
principal-agent problems
crisis bargaining
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Leonhardt, Nadine
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
- (wo)
-
Essen
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.4419/86788511
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Leonhardt, Nadine
- Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Entstanden
- 2013
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