Democratic Peace – A Principal-Agent Approach

Arbeitspapier

The present paper explicitly models the principal-agent relationship between a democratic population and its elected representative within a standard war bargaining setup. I find that the specific structure of this relationship and the problems resulting from it help overcome information asymmetries in crisis bargaining. This provides an alternative theoretic explanation of democracies‘ signaling advantage which may turn out to be more realistic than the concept of audience costs.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-86788-511-9
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 453

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
• Subject: democratic peace ; principal-agent problems ; crisis bargaining

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Leonhardt, Nadine
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
• (where): Essen
• (when): 2013

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.4419/86788511
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88745
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET