Arbeitspapier

Democratic Peace – A Principal-Agent Approach

The present paper explicitly models the principal-agent relationship between a democratic population and its elected representative within a standard war bargaining setup. I find that the specific structure of this relationship and the problems resulting from it help overcome information asymmetries in crisis bargaining. This provides an alternative theoretic explanation of democracies‘ signaling advantage which may turn out to be more realistic than the concept of audience costs.

ISBN
978-3-86788-511-9
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 453

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
Subject
democratic peace
principal-agent problems
crisis bargaining

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Leonhardt, Nadine
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
(where)
Essen
(when)
2013

DOI
doi:10.4419/86788511
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Leonhardt, Nadine
  • Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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