Hochschulschrift
Compensation, Incentives and Risk-Taking in Principal-Agent Models
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Karlsruhe, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Diss., 2012
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Anreizsystem
Portfolio Selection
LEN-Modell
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Karlsruhe
- (wer)
-
KIT-Bibliothek
- (wann)
-
2012
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Veraart, L. A. M.
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:swb:90-338948
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:53 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
- Urban, Sebastian Philipp
- Veraart, L. A. M.
- KIT-Bibliothek
Entstanden
- 2012
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?
Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt
Do managerial risk-taking incentives influence firms' exchange rate exposure?
Risk-sharing or risk-taking? Counterparty risk, incentives and margins
Abandon ship: inside debt and risk-taking incentives in bad times
Competition and risk-taking
Executive compensation : three essays on managerial risk-taking, long-term orientation, and convergence in executive compensation
Emerging competition and risk-taking incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
The influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking : the role of mutual monitoring
The influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking: the role of mutual monitoring
How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?
Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt
Do managerial risk-taking incentives influence firms' exchange rate exposure?
Risk-sharing or risk-taking? Counterparty risk, incentives and margins
Abandon ship: inside debt and risk-taking incentives in bad times
Competition and risk-taking
Executive compensation : three essays on managerial risk-taking, long-term orientation, and convergence in executive compensation
Emerging competition and risk-taking incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
The influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking : the role of mutual monitoring
The influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking: the role of mutual monitoring
How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?
Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt
Do managerial risk-taking incentives influence firms' exchange rate exposure?
Risk-sharing or risk-taking? Counterparty risk, incentives and margins
Abandon ship: inside debt and risk-taking incentives in bad times
Competition and risk-taking
Executive compensation : three essays on managerial risk-taking, long-term orientation, and convergence in executive compensation
Emerging competition and risk-taking incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
The influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking : the role of mutual monitoring