Arbeitspapier
R&D Incentives under Bertrand Competition: A Differential Game
We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment monotonically increases in the number of firms. This result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic. We also prove that, if competition is suficiently tough, any increase in product substitutability reduces R&D efforts.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 519
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Forschung
Technischer Fortschritt
Marktstruktur
Oligopol
Preiswettbewerb
Spieltheorie
Spillover-Effekt
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2004
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4771
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cellini, Roberto
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2004
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