Arbeitspapier
Trade Costs, FDI incentives, and the Intensity of Price Competition
Empirical evidence shows that an increase in trade liberalisation causes an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we propose an explanation to this apparent puzzle by exploiting the intensity of competition in a Bertrand duopoly with convex costs where the two firms enter in a new market. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, delivering a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing, to show that softening competition may indeed more than offset the standard effect generated by trade costs, thereby leading to a positive relationship between trade liberalisation and FDIs.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 810
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Multinational Firms; International Business
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gori, Giuseppe Francesco
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2012
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4208
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gori, Giuseppe Francesco
- Lambertini, Luca
- Tampieri, Alessandro
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2012
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