Arbeitspapier
Signaling versus auditing
We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education à la Spence (1973), and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers' productivities. Audits are costly and non-contractible. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our results feature new auditing patterns and explain empirical observations in labor economics like wage differentials and comparative statics of education choices. Our analysis applies also to other signal- ing problems, e.g., the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 286
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Subject
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Signaling
Information Acquisition
Auditing
Wage Differentials
WageDispersion
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bester, Helmut
Lang, Matthias
Li, Jianpei
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (where)
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München und Berlin
- (when)
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2021
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bester, Helmut
- Lang, Matthias
- Li, Jianpei
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Time of origin
- 2021
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