Arbeitspapier

Public Firms as Regulatory and Auditing Instruments

We re-examine the regulatory role of a public firm in an environment of private but correlated information about industry costs. We study three regimes of mixed market interaction involving both public and private firms: a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, an asymmetric Bayesian equilibrium in which the public firm is able to commit to production before the private firms and a mechanism in which the regulator designs an incentive compatible schedule for the industry. We find that a public firms plays an important strategic informational role which strengthens its role as a disciplinary regulatory instrument. Further, we find that this strategic informational role is considerably enchanced as we move from indirect regulatory schemes to direct regulation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 809

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Garvie, Devon
Ware, Roger
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
1991

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Garvie, Devon
  • Ware, Roger
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1991

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