Arbeitspapier

Public Firms as Regulatory and Auditing Instruments

We re-examine the regulatory role of a public firm in an environment of private but correlated information about industry costs. We study three regimes of mixed market interaction involving both public and private firms: a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, an asymmetric Bayesian equilibrium in which the public firm is able to commit to production before the private firms and a mechanism in which the regulator designs an incentive compatible schedule for the industry. We find that a public firms plays an important strategic informational role which strengthens its role as a disciplinary regulatory instrument. Further, we find that this strategic informational role is considerably enchanced as we move from indirect regulatory schemes to direct regulation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 809

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Garvie, Devon
Ware, Roger
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(where)
Kingston (Ontario)
(when)
1991

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Garvie, Devon
  • Ware, Roger
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 1991

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