Arbeitspapier
Public Firms as Regulatory and Auditing Instruments
We re-examine the regulatory role of a public firm in an environment of private but correlated information about industry costs. We study three regimes of mixed market interaction involving both public and private firms: a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, an asymmetric Bayesian equilibrium in which the public firm is able to commit to production before the private firms and a mechanism in which the regulator designs an incentive compatible schedule for the industry. We find that a public firms plays an important strategic informational role which strengthens its role as a disciplinary regulatory instrument. Further, we find that this strategic informational role is considerably enchanced as we move from indirect regulatory schemes to direct regulation.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 809
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Garvie, Devon
Ware, Roger
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Kingston (Ontario)
- (when)
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1991
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Garvie, Devon
- Ware, Roger
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1991