Arbeitspapier

Environmental auditing in management systems and public policy

New international standards for environmental auditing are now being actively promoted by public authorities and adopted by private firms. One important feature of these standards is their emphasis on managerial systems and incentives that support a wiser use of environmental resources. This paper studies such a system, in which incentive compensation may be based in part on the results of an environmental audit. It is found that optimal wages after an environmental audit is performed should have a greater range than wages paid when no audit has occurred. It is also shown that the decision to conduct an environmental audit and the size of the expected wage in this case depend crucially on whether the agent's prudence (or precautionary motives) dominates or not his aversion to risk. It is finally found that the insertion of environmental audits within current management systems would certainly induce a manager to care more about the environment; although this may come at the expense of less concern for other activities, we find plausible circumstances in which properly designed environmental audits overcome such a trade-off and increase the manager's attention to both environmental and traditional tasks. Some implications of the analysis for environmental public policy are also discussed briefly.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 3.1997

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Accounting: Other
Thema
Multi-task principal-agent analysis
environmental auditing
risk aversion
prudence

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard
Gabel, H. Landis
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
1997

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard
  • Gabel, H. Landis
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 1997

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