Artikel

Signaling versus Auditing

We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education, and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers' productivities. Audits are costly and non‐contractible. We characterize the trade‐offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our results feature new auditing patterns and explain empirical observations in labor economics like wage differentials and comparative statics of education choices. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, for example, the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: The RAND Journal of Economics ; ISSN: 1756-2171 ; Volume: 52 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 859-883

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bester, Helmut
Lang, Matthias
Li, Jianpei
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wiley
(wo)
Hoboken, NJ
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12394
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Bester, Helmut
  • Lang, Matthias
  • Li, Jianpei
  • Wiley

Entstanden

  • 2021

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