Artikel

Signaling versus Auditing

We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education, and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers' productivities. Audits are costly and non‐contractible. We characterize the trade‐offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our results feature new auditing patterns and explain empirical observations in labor economics like wage differentials and comparative statics of education choices. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, for example, the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: The RAND Journal of Economics ; ISSN: 1756-2171 ; Volume: 52 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 859-883

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bester, Helmut
Lang, Matthias
Li, Jianpei
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12394
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Bester, Helmut
  • Lang, Matthias
  • Li, Jianpei
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2021

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