Arbeitspapier

Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing

This paper studies the strategic effect of a difference in timing of verification in an agency model. A principal may choose between two equally efficient verification procedures: monitoring and auditing. Under auditing the principal receives additional information. Due to a double moral hazard problem, there exists a tension between incentives for effort and incentives for verification. Auditing exacerbates this tension and, consequently, requires steeper incentive schemes than monitoring. Hence, auditing is suboptimal if 1) steep incentives structures are costly to implement due to bounded transfers, or 2) steep incentive schemes induce higher rents due to limited liability. verification in an agency model. A principal may choose between two equally efficient verification procedures: monitoring and auditing. Under auditing the principal receives additional information. Due to a double moral hazard problem, there exists a tension between incentives for effort and incentives for verification. Auditing exacerbates this tension and, consequently, requires steeper incentive schemes than monitoring. Hence, auditing is suboptimal if 1) steep incentives structures are costly to implement due to bounded transfers, or 2) steep incentive schemes induce higher rents due to limited liability.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 33

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
timing of verification
double moral hazard
monitoring
auditi

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Strausz, Roland
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2005

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13515
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13515-0
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Strausz, Roland
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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