Overprotected politicians

Arbeitspapier

This paper argues that politicians are overprotected. The costs of political assassination differ systematically depending on whether a private or a public point of view is taken. A politician attributes a very high (if not infinite) cost to his or her survival. The social cost of political assassination is much smaller as politicians are replaceable. Conversely, the private cost of the security measures is low for politicians, its bulk - including time loss and inconvenience - is imposed on taxpayers and the general public. The extent of overprotection is larger in dictatorial than in democratic countries.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2019

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General ; Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy ; Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General
• Subject: Sicherheitsgewerbe ; Politiker ; Soziale Kosten ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Frey, Bruno S.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26064
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET