Arbeitspapier
Overprotected Politicians
This paper argues that politicians are overprotected. The costs of political assassination differ systematically depending on whether a private or a public point of view is taken. A politician attributes a very high (if not infinite) cost to his or her survival. The social cost of political assassination is much smaller as politicians are replaceable. Conversely, the private cost of the security measures is low for politicians, its bulk - including time loss and inconvenience - is imposed on taxpayers and the general public. The extent of overprotection is larger in dictatorial than in democratic countries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2007-07
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General
- Thema
-
Politicians
rational choice
assassination
security
democracy
dictatorship
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Frey, Bruno S.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Frey, Bruno S.
- Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
Entstanden
- 2007
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