Arbeitspapier
Politicians: Be Killed or Survive
In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2008-25
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Criminal Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General
- Thema
-
Assassinations
rational choice
governance
democracy
dictatorship
deterrence
protection
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Frey, Bruno S.
Torgler, Benno
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Frey, Bruno S.
- Torgler, Benno
- Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
Entstanden
- 2008