Arbeitspapier

Politicians: be killed or survive

In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2483

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Criminal Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General
Thema
Assassinations
rational choice
governance
democracy
dictatorship
deterrence
protection
Politische Gewalt
Rationales Verhalten
Politisches System
Governance-Ansatz
Innere Sicherheit
Politische Stabilität
Welt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Frey, Bruno S.
Torgler, Benno
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Frey, Bruno S.
  • Torgler, Benno
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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