Why Kill Politicians? A Rational Choice Analysis of Political Assassinations

Arbeitspapier

In the course of history a large number of politicians has been assassinated. A rational choice analysis is used to distinguish the expected marginal benefits of killing, and the marginal cost of attacking a politician. The comparative analysis of various equilibria helps us to gain insights into specific historical events. The analysis suggests that - in addition to well-known security measures - an extension of democracy, a rule by a committee of several politicians, more decentralization via the division of power and federalism, and a strengthening of civil society significantly reduce politicians' probability of being attacked and killed.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2007-08

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Criminal Law ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General
• Subject: Rational choice ; democracy ; dictatorship ; assassination ; deterrence

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Frey, Bruno S.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214382
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET