Arbeitspapier

Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability

The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 44.2004

Classification
Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Subject
Collusion
Partial cartels
Trigger strategies
Optimal punishment
Kartell
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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