Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability

Arbeitspapier

The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 44.2004

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
• Subject: Collusion ; Partial cartels ; Trigger strategies ; Optimal punishment ; Kartell ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117922
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET