Arbeitspapier
Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability
The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 44.2004
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Subject
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Collusion
Partial cartels
Trigger strategies
Optimal punishment
Kartell
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2004