Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability

Arbeitspapier

The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 44.2004

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
• Thema: Collusion ; Partial cartels ; Trigger strategies ; Optimal punishment ; Kartell ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117922
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ