Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other?s markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, thus integration is pro-competitive. If integration consists of a reductions in unit (fixed) trade costs a price setting cartel is strengthened (unaffected), while a quantity setting one is weakened.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 432

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Economic Integration ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: Collusive behavior ; trade liberalisation ; specific tariffs ; market access cost ; Kartell ; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung ; Aussenhandelsliberalisierung ; Wirtschaftsintegration ; Zolltheorie ; Kosten ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schröder, Philipp J. H.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18168
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ