Arbeitspapier
Cartel stability in an exhaustible resource model
A simple oligopolistic common-pool exhaustible resource game is considered. By analysing punishment strategies, including optimal punishments, it is possible to determine which cartel agreements are implementable in a non-cooperative play of the game. Joint-profit maximizing allocations are sustainable for sufficiently low discounting, but in general it is shown that no folk-theorem exists for this model. In particular, for sufficiently high elasticities of demand, it is shown that optimal punishments are not sufficiently severe to enforce stationary symmetric extraction paths, thus confirming the hypothesis that sufficient market power is needed for a cartel to be stable.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 61
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Thomas, Jonathan P.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Konstanz
- (wann)
-
1988
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Thomas, Jonathan P.
- Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 1988
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Cartel stability in experimental auctions
Cartel Stability and Economic Integration
Strategic delegation improves cartel stability
Cartel Stability with Subjective Detection Beliefs
RJVs in Product Innovation and Cartel Stability
Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule
Cartel Stability with Time-dependent Detection Probabilities
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
Cartel stability in times of low interest rates
A Technical Note on Cartel Stability in Large Economies
Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Cartel stability in experimental auctions
Cartel Stability and Economic Integration
Strategic delegation improves cartel stability
Cartel Stability with Subjective Detection Beliefs
RJVs in Product Innovation and Cartel Stability
Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule
Cartel Stability with Time-dependent Detection Probabilities
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
Cartel stability in times of low interest rates
A Technical Note on Cartel Stability in Large Economies
Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Cartel stability in experimental auctions
Cartel Stability and Economic Integration
Strategic delegation improves cartel stability
Cartel Stability with Subjective Detection Beliefs
RJVs in Product Innovation and Cartel Stability
Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule
Cartel Stability with Time-dependent Detection Probabilities
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
Cartel stability in times of low interest rates