Arbeitspapier
Forward Guidance for Monetary Policy: Is It Desirable?
In this paper we assess whether forward guidance for monetary policy regarding the future path of interest rates is desirable. We distinguish between two cases where forward guidance for monetary policy may be helpful. First, forward guidance may reveal private information of the central bank. We argue that vague, non-binding statements may be desirable. Second, forward guidance may be used as a commitment device. In this case, policy forecasts may be desirable in a classic inflation-bias framework but not in a New Keynesian framework.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 08/84
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- Thema
-
central banks
transparency
commitment
Federal Reserve
policy inclinations
signaling
Geldpolitisches Ziel
Zinspolitik
Politische Kommunikation
Signalling
Neoklassische Synthese
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gersbach, Hans
Hahn, Volker
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2008
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005562732
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gersbach, Hans
- Hahn, Volker
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2008
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