Arbeitspapier
Concession bargaining: An experimental comparison of protocols and time horizons
Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as unfolding in time, concessions can also be studied in normal form or by conditioning only on failure of earlier agreement attempts. We experimentally compare three protocols of concession bargaining, the normal form or static one, the one where concessions only condition on earlier failures and the truly dynamic one. In spite of their considerable differences in conditioning, the three protocols do not differ in agreement ratio, efficiency and inequality of agreements. There are, however, effects of the maximal number of trials to reach an agreement by concession making and of protocol on when to abstain from conceding.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2013-052
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
concession bargaining
conflict
deadline
dynamic interaction
emotions
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Alberti, Federica
Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
Tsutsui, Kei
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Alberti, Federica
- Fischer, Sven
- Güth, Werner
- Tsutsui, Kei
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2013
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