Arbeitspapier

Alternating offer bargaining experiments with varying institutional details

The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how 'the pie' changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once repeated before moving on to the next one what defines a cycle of altogether 16 successive plays. Participants play three such cycles. There are no major experience effects but strong and reliable effects of anticipated rule changes. The latter, however, are not due to strategic considerations but rather to the social norms of fairness and efficiency.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2001,9

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Anderhub, Vital
Güth, Werner
Marchand, Nadège
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2001

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048665
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Anderhub, Vital
  • Güth, Werner
  • Marchand, Nadège
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Entstanden

  • 2001

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