Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game

Arbeitspapier

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the quality of information feedbacks provided after each play. If subjects rely only on their personal database, long run behavior resembles a Self-confirming equi- librium whereby less pro-social types take at earlier nodes due to prediction errors. Aggregate information release decreases heterogeneity of behavior by increasing the passing rates of pro-selfs and play moves towards Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2015-012

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: social preferences ; learning ; Self-confirming equilibrium ; experiment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gamba, Astrid ; Regner, Tobias
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Friedrich Schiller University Jena
• (wo): Jena
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121283
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ