Arbeitspapier

Games with synergistic preferences

In economic situations a player often has preferences regarding not only his or her own outcome but also regarding what happens to fellow players, concerns that are entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down a player's final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper, building on a model due to Bergstrom (1989, 1999), presents a simple structure in the context of game theory that incorporates the synergies between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet it is straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 11-15

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Thema
altruism
interdependent preferences
fairness
cooperation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jamison, Julian C.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
(wo)
Boston, MA
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jamison, Julian C.
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Entstanden

  • 2011

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