Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust

Arbeitspapier

In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only cycling around the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than being chosen strategically.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1998,72

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Relation of Economics to Social Values ; Noncooperative Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Evolutionary game models ; Endogenous preference formation ; Trust relationships

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Güth, Werner ; Kliemt, Hartmut ; Peleg, Bezalel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 1998

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61268
• URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10060491
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET