Arbeitspapier
Effects of exclusion on social preferences
In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects response behavior.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2011,34
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
- Thema
-
experiment
social preferences
exclusion
bargaining
ultimatum game
Ultimatumspiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fischer, Sven
- Güth, Werner
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2011
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