Arbeitspapier
Effects of exclusion on social preferences
In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after the exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by it. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion has substantial effects on behavior.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2011,053
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
- Subject
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exclusion
bargaining
ultimatum game
social preferences
experiment
Ultimatumspiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Test
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (where)
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Jena
- (when)
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2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fischer, Sven
- Güth, Werner
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2011