Arbeitspapier

Effects of exclusion on social preferences

In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after the exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by it. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion has substantial effects on behavior.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2011,053

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
Subject
exclusion
bargaining
ultimatum game
social preferences
experiment
Ultimatumspiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fischer, Sven
  • Güth, Werner
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2011

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