Hochschulschrift
Reciprocity, endogenous incomplete contracts, and the role of options in law
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783898251501
3898251500
- Maße
-
21 cm
- Umfang
-
VI, 128 S.
- Ausgabe
-
Als Ms. gedr.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
graph. Darst.
Zugl.: München, Univ., Diss., 2000
- Schlagwort
-
Kontrakttheorie
Eingeschränkte Rationalität
Strafrecht
Sanktion
Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
11.06.2025, 14:01 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
- Klein, Alexander
- dissertation.de
Entstanden
- 2000
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