Arbeitspapier
Prisoners' other dilemma
We find that contrary to common perception, cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted prisoner's dilemma is in many relevant cases not very plausible, or at least questionable: for a significant subset of the payoff-discount factor parameter space cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated by non-cooperation (according to the Harsanyi-Selten 1988 criterion). Examples include collusion equilibria in the repeated Cournot duopoly.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 437
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Prisoner's Dilemma
Risk dominance
Repeated games
Equilibrium selection
Cooperation
Collusion
Gefangenendilemma
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Blonski, Matthias
Spagnolo, Giancarlo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Blonski, Matthias
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Entstanden
- 2001
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