Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma

Arbeitspapier

Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners' dilemma. We find conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner's only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them different pieces of information. We also find conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner's best equilibria.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2010-16

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Information Disclosure ; Generalized Prisoners' Dilemma ; Uninformative Equilibria ; Partially or Fully Informative Equilibria

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Eliaz, Kfir ; Serrano, Roberto
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Brown University, Department of Economics
• (where): Providence, RI
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62615
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET