Arbeitspapier
Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly Supergames
The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners' dilemma backwards, from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion, and where discount rates appear as the payo¤s. Likewise, a prisoners' dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 264
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
-
1996
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5047
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 1996
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Price Vs Quantity in Duopoly Supergames With Close Substitutes
Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
Dynamic Hotelling Duopoly with Linear Transportation Costs
Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly
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Choosing Roles in a Duopoly for Endogenously Differentiated Products
Stackelberg Leadership in a Dynamic Duopoly with Capital Accumulation
Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly
Quality and Advertising in a Dynamic Duopoly
Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Price vs Quantity in a Repeated Differentiated Duopoly
Capacity Accumulation and Utilization in a Differential Duopoly Game