Arbeitspapier
Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
We analyse a model of vertical differentiation focusing on the trade-off between entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low quality, versus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a superior product. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium where the leader enters with a lower quality than the follower, for low discount factors, for high costs of quality and for low consumers' willingness to pay for quality.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 492
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
Tedeschi, Piero
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2003
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4802
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Tedeschi, Piero
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2003
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