Arbeitspapier

Existence of Equilibrium in A Differentiated Duopoly With Network Externalities

The existence of a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in qualities and prices is investigated in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where quality improvements require a quadratic variable cost and network externalities appears in consumer utility. Full market coverage is assumed. We show that the incentive to predate prevents firms to reach a pure strategy noncooperative equilibrium with prices above marginal costs. If network externalities are sufficiently large, a Bertrand equilibrium with zero profits may arise, although the amount of product differentiation is strictly positive. If the weight of network externalities exceeds that of hedonic satisfaction in consumer preferences, then predation is always a dominant strategy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 333

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lambertini, Luca
Orsini, Raimondello
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
1998

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4976
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Orsini, Raimondello
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 1998

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