Estimating Bargaining-related Tax Advantages of Multinational Firms

Arbeitspapier

Bargaining power may explain the tax differences between multinational and national enterprises beyond MNEs’ profit shifting. Larger firms (mostly MNEs) are more valuable for tax authorities for various reasons. In threatening relocation, larger firms extract greater deductions, resulting in a regressive ETR schedule and lower ETRs for size-related reasons. MNEs face lower relocation costs than NEs, which enhances their bargaining position. Using French firm-level data and entropy balancing, we find that the regressivity of the French tax schedule reduces MNEs’ ETRs by 2.52 percentage points (size effect), while their relocation threat leads to a 3.58 percentage point reduction.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6979

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions
• Thema: profit taxation ; multinational firms ; entropy balancing

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Egger, Peter H. ; Strecker, Nora M. ; Zoller-Rydzek, Benedikt
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/180241
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ