Unions' bargaining coordination in multinational enterprises

Artikel

This paper investigates the patterns of bargaining in multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the presence of labor unions coordination activities. It derives the bargaining regimes which arise as sub-game perfect equilibria, and considers both simultaneous and sequential games where parties choose whether to coordinate wage negotiations across subsidiaries. It shows that unions' per member transaction costs may attenuate the conflict of interests between bargaining parties as regards the centralization level at which negotiations should take place.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 373-392 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects ; Welfare Economics: General
• Thema: Bargaining ; Multinational enterprises ; Labor unions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Buccella, Domenico
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Springer
• (wo): Heidelberg
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.1007/s13209-013-0097-z
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158512
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ