Unions' Bargaining Coordination in Multinational Enterprises

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates the coordination of bargaining activities among labor unions in a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) with plants in different countries. Making use of a threestage game where the parties sequentially decide whether o coordinate negotiations, it derives the bargaining regimes arising as sub-game perfect equilibria. In presence of workers perfect substitutes in production and symmetry in the plants' efficiency, it is shown that unions' transaction costs may attenuate the conflict of interests among the parties as regards the level of coordination at which negotiations should take place.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: FIW Working Paper ; No. 61

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects ; Welfare Economics: General
• Thema: bargaining ; Multinational Enterprises ; labor unions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Buccella, Domenico
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): FIW - Research Centre International Economics
• (wo): Vienna
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121061
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ