Lobbying activities of multinational firms

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates if multinationals in.uence the political process through lobbying more effectively than national firms. First, I introduce a model which contrasts a multinational's incentives for lobbying with those of a national firm. Then the effect of lobbying on the political decision is analyzed. I conclude that multinationals have smaller incentives to lobby because they have smaller stakes in national markets. But the effectiveness of lobbying by multinationals might be higher if the government cares much about production in the home country. The resulting regulation depends on the relative strength of these effects.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 0205

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Economics of Regulation
• Subject: multinational enterprizes ; regulation ; policy formation ; lobbying ; interest groups ; foreign direct investment ; Multinationales Unternehmen ; Interessenpolitik ; Direktinvestition ; Theorie ; Policy-Ansatz

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Polk, Andreas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76236
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET