Arbeitspapier

Lobbying and the power of multinational firms

Are national or multinational firms better lobbyists? This paper analyzes the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting regulation levels for national and multinational firms. We identify three countervailing forces, the easier-to-shut-down effect, the easier-to-curb-exports effect and the multiple-plant effect. The interplay of these three forces determines whether national or multinational firms produce more, depending on such parameters as the potential environmental damages, transportation costs and the in uence of the firm. We also show that welfare levels are higher with multinational firms than with national firms when there is no lobbying, but that lobbying can reverse the welfare ordering.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1008

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Multinational Firms; International Business
Economics of Regulation
Thema
multinational enterprises
regulation
policy formation
lobbying
interest groups
foreign direct investment
Interessenpolitik
Multinationales Unternehmen
Interessenvertretung
Direktinvestition
Neue politische Ökonomie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Polk, Andreas
Schmutzler, Armin
Müller, Adrian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Polk, Andreas
  • Schmutzler, Armin
  • Müller, Adrian
  • University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute

Entstanden

  • 2010

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