Arbeitspapier
Incentives and coordination in vertically related energy markets
We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market including gas shippers, electricity generators and retailers. We show how reward interdependence between strategic business units within a vertically integrated firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy markets. The effects are shown to be distinct from those of the raising rivals’ costs model. In our case, higher prices relate to the nature of energy markets, which facilitate the emergence of financial netback effects.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2006-02
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Utilities: General
- Thema
-
Agent-based modelling
energy markets
reward interdependence
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Micola, Augusto Rupérez
Banal Estañol, Albert
Bunn, Derek W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Micola, Augusto Rupérez
- Banal Estañol, Albert
- Bunn, Derek W.
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2006
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