R&D incentives in vertically related markets

Arbeitspapier

This paper focuses on incentives to invest in research and development (R&D) in vertically related markets. In a bilateral duopoly setup, we consider how process R&D incentives of the firms in both upstream and downstream market depend on the intensity of simultaneous interbrand and intrabrand competition. Among the results: both interbrand and intrabrand competition have twofold effects on R&D incentives. Existence of a vertically related market with imperfect competition lowers both the incentives to invest in process R&D and the competitive advantage through the R&D investment. We will show how the impact of a firm's R&D investments in either market on consumer surplus as well as on the profits of all firms in both markets depends on exogenous parameters.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 07-2013

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
• Subject: research and development ; vertical relations ; bilateral oligopoly ; product differentiation ; process innovation ; interbrand and intrabrand competition

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Memar, Ahmad Reza Saboori ; Götz, Georg
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
• (where): Marburg
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73142
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET