Incentives and coordination in vertically related energy markets
Abstract: We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market. We show how reward interdependence between strategic business units within a vertically integrated firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy markets. The effects are shown to be distinct from those of the raising rivals’ costs model. In our case, higher prices relate to the nature of energy markets, which facilitate the emergence of financial netback effects
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 67 (2008) 2 ; 381-393
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (when)
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2008
- Creator
- DOI
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10.1016/j.jebo.2006.12.007
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-254631
- Rights
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Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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25.03.2025, 1:53 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Micola, Augusto Rupérez
- Banal-Estañol, Albert
- Bunn, Derek W.
Time of origin
- 2008
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Location of foreign direct investment in vertically related markets
Manufacturers Mergers and Product Variety in Vertically Related Markets
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