Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel
Incentives and coordination in vertically related energy markets
We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market. We show how reward interdependence between strategic business units within a vertically integrated firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy markets. The effects are shown to be distinct from those of the raising rivals’ costs model. In our case, higher prices relate to the nature of energy markets, which facilitate the emergence of financial netback effects.
- Umfang
-
Seite(n): 381-393
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
- Erschienen in
-
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67(2)
- Thema
-
Wirtschaft
Management
Wirtschaftssektoren
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Micola, Augusto Rupérez
Banal-Estañol, Albert
Bunn, Derek W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Niederlande
- (wann)
-
2008
- DOI
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-254631
- Rechteinformation
-
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
21.06.2024, 16:27 MESZ
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Objekttyp
- Zeitschriftenartikel
Beteiligte
- Micola, Augusto Rupérez
- Banal-Estañol, Albert
- Bunn, Derek W.
Entstanden
- 2008
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