Incentives and coordination in vertically related energy markets

Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market. We show how reward interdependence between strategic business units within a vertically integrated firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy markets. The effects are shown to be distinct from those of the raising rivals’ costs model. In our case, higher prices relate to the nature of energy markets, which facilitate the emergence of financial netback effects.

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• Extent: Seite(n): 381-393
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67(2)

Classification and Topics

• Subject: Wirtschaft ; Management ; Wirtschaftssektoren

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Micola, Augusto Rupérez ; Banal-Estañol, Albert ; Bunn, Derek W.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Niederlande
• (when): 2008

Further information

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.12.007
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-254631
• Rights: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln