On the use of menus in sequential common agency

Arbeitspapier

We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1498

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Information and Uncertainty: Other ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: sequential contracting ; mechanism design ; menus theorems

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Calzolariy, Giacomo ; Pavan, Alessandro
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59685
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ