Arbeitspapier

Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals

I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that, in contrast with mechanism design models with one informed principal, Myerson's Inscrutability Principle fails when there are many informed principals. I also find that, in contrast with common agency models with uninformed principals, the Delegation Principle (Menu Theorem) fails when principals are informed. I then focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which principals offer their mechanisms without randomizing. I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games with delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus and send cheap-talk signals. Next, I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games without delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus of direct revelation mechanisms, to which they truthfully report their types.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1541

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Economics of Contract: Theory
Thema
common agency
informed principals
Inscrutability Principle
Delegation Principle
menus
signals
direct revelation mechanisms

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Galperti, Simone
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Galperti, Simone
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 2011

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