Arbeitspapier
The gains of ignoring risk: Insurance with better informed principals
We study a competitive insurance market in which insurers have an imperfect informative advantage over policyholders. We show that the presence of insurers privately and heterogeneously informed about risk can explain the concentration levels, the persistent profitability and the pooling of risk observed in some insurance markets. Furthermore, we find that a lower market concentration may entail an increase in insurance premia.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 84
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- Thema
-
Insurance markets
Asymmetric information
Risk assessment
Market concentration
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Abrardi, Laura
Colombo, Luca
Tedeschi, Piero
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Abrardi, Laura
- Colombo, Luca
- Tedeschi, Piero
- Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
Entstanden
- 2019
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