Arbeitspapier
"Irresponsible lending" with a better informed lender
We present a simple model of personal finance in which an incumbent lender has an information advantage vis-a-vis both potential competitors and households. In order to extract more consumer surplus, a lender with sufficient market power may engage in irresponsiblelending, approving credit even if this is knowingly against a household’s best interest. Unless rival lenders are equally well informed, competition may reduce welfare. This holds, in particular, if less informed rivals can free ride on the incumbent’s superior screening ability.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IMFS Working Paper Series ; No. 32
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Inderst, Roman
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-72920
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Inderst, Roman
- Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
Entstanden
- 2009
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